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PREVIEW OF FINDINGS
A SYNOPSIS of this volume wiii serve as an outline of its framework and
as a preview of its main findings, though most of the necessary qualifi-
cations must be omitted. The monograph falls into three major parts.
The first of these (Part A) deals with real capital formation in resi-
dential real estate and the factors affecting it. The second (Part B)
analyzes the flow, uses, and sources of capital funds in this field. The
third (Part C) attempts to appraise the long-term prospects for capital
growth in residential real estate.
The Record of Capital Formation
The analysis of capital formation begins with a presentation of the
record of private residential construction over more than six decades,
1889 to 1953 (Chapter III). When the familiar long cycles are examined
for secular trends, construction expenditures in current prices show a
long-term increase. In real terms, however, there has been a pro-
nounced change in the rate of growth of gross capital formation.
Averages for three long swings in real terms show a substantial rise
from the first cycle, approximately 1892-1905, to the second, approxi-
mately 1905-1925, and a smaller rise or level movement from the
second cycle to the third which is marked off by the 1925 peak and
the apparent peak of 1950. This pattern is consistent no matter what
unit of measurement of gross capital fonnation is used: the number of
dwelling units for which construction was started during the year,
expenditures in constant prices for new dwelling units, or expenditures
in constant prices for new units plus additions and alterations. Expendi-
tures in "constant prices" (current prices adjusted to the 1929 price
base) represent actual physical construction more accurately thaü
would dollar expenditures unmodified for price change.
Annual dwelling unit starts averaged about two-thirds more during
the second cycle than in the preceding swing, but during the third
cycle they averaged barely 4 per cent more than in the second cycle.
Thus the secular growth of capital formation in residential real estate—
certainly beginning long before the nineties, with which this record
commences—seems to have come to a halt during the 1925-1950 period.
A similar picture emerges on comparison of shorter but more recent
periods including part of the postwar housing boom. Annual averages
of deflated expenditures for residential construction from 1946 to
1953 were only a little higher than during the decade of the twenties.
The number of dwelling units started, however, averaged 990,000 a8 PREVIEWOFFINDINGS
year during the eight postwar years as against 700,000 during the
twenties. This difference between dwelling units started and deflated
expenditures highlights a long-term trend toward smaller real input
per dwelling unit, which will be discussed later.
The relative amplitude of long swings has been increasing over the
six decades. Cyclical amplitudes of dwelling unit starts increased more
than 40 per cent between the first and second cycles and by about
two-thirds between the second and third long swings. Expenditures
in constant prices show an even more pronounced rise in cyclical
amplitudes. The two World Wars and their aftermaths during the
second and third cycles probably accounted for much of this increase
in cyclical instability. Whether or not these cycles were accentuated
by wars, long swings in residential construction since World War I
have closely coincided with those in the rate of growth of the economy
as a whole. In contrast, earlier experience had shown a significant
divergence in timing between long cycles in residential building and
in the rate of growth of total (i.e. gross) national product. This coinci-
dence since World War I must have reinforced the cyclical amplitude
of both gross national product and residential construction activity.
Trends in gross capital formation may be partly determined by
changes in the composition of residential construction. Several major
changes have indeed occurred. First, the "structure-mix" of house-
keeping residential building has varied significantly since the beginning
of this century. Dwelling units in structures with two or more house-
keeping units represented a growing proportion of all new dwelling
units through about 1930, although they never accounted for more
than half of all units built. This was the era of city building, with its
progressively intensified use of land. Since then single-family houses
have increased in relative importance; almost 85 per cent of all new
units during the forties were this type of structure. The automobile,
of course, has been the main initiator of the recent era of suburban
sprawl, with its emphasis on the single-family house. Among other
things, this drastic change in structure-mix has affected average con-
struction expenditure per dwelling unit.
Second, additions to and alterations of existing structures have
become a more important component of gross capital formation. From
1915 to 1953, expenditures for additions and alterations averaged about
11 per cent of expenditures for new dwelling units, and there is reason
to believe that this ratio, because of deficiencies in data, understates
their relative importance. Expenditures for additions and alterations
have been more stable cyclically than expenditures for new construc-
tion. Their ratio to new housekeeping residential construction has
risen as the total number of existing houses has increased relative toPREVIEW OF FINDINGS 9
new construction. Conversions of existing dwelling units have repre-
sented a growing proportion of the net additions to the total supply
of dwelling units.
On the other hand, expenditures for "nonhousekeeping" construction
such as hotels, tourist courts, and summer cottages have declined since
the twenties relative to those for "housekeeping" construction, or dwell-
ing units for year-round occupancy. From the last decade of the nine-
teenth century to the twenties the relative importance of nonhouse-
keeping facilities in total residential construction increased sharply.
In the twenties $7 was spent on new nonhousekeeping construction for
every $100 spent on new dwelling units. From 1940 to 1949 the average
ratio was only 2.8 per cent, and the ratio for the recent postwar period
alone was even lower. To be sure, the past two decades witnessed a
sharp increase in the construction of motels, summer cottages, tourist
courts, and similar accommodations—in response to the growing popu-
larity of the automobile and of recreation. The proliferation of these
relatively inexpensive facilities, however, so far has failed by a wide
margin to offset the drastic decline in expenditures for urban hotel con-
struction, a highly expensive building type which had dominated the
nonhousekeeping category before the thirties.
Analysis of net capital formation, which is the subject of Chapter IV,
sharpens the impression of a drastic secular change in the rate of real
growth in residential construction. (Net capital formation is obtained
by subtracting capital consumption allowances from gross investment.)
Averages for the three long swings in net capital formation in constant
prices show a rise of only about 5percent from the first to the second
cycle (as against an increase of about one-third for gross capital
formation) and a drop of almost two-fifths from the 1905-1925 to the
1925-1950 cycle (as against a level movement for gross). Annual
average net capital formation in constant prices during the eight post-
war years 1946-1953 was 7 per cent lower than that in the twenties
(as against a slight increase for gross). The marked difference between
the trends in gross and net capital formation is due, of course, to the
continuous increase in the physical stock of housing, with an attendant
rise in the total of capital consumption allowances, combined with a
substantial decline in gross capital formation relative to the value of
the housing stock. The ratio of gross capital formation to residential
capital in constant prices fell from an average of 74 per cent in 1890-
1909 to 56 per cent in 1910-1929 and 24 per cent in 1930-1949.
In this context, estimates of capital consumption are crucial (see
Appendix E). It must suffice here to say that capital consumption
allowances as calculated for this purpose áonsist of (1) an annual
depreciation charge of a constant 2 per cent of net cumulated structure10 PREVIEW OF FINDINGS
values—resulting in a lower allowance than is found in most other
studies of capital formation in residential real estate—and (2) esti-
mated demolition losses.
As would be expected, the ratio of net to gross capital formation has
shown a secular decline. In current prices, every $100 in gross capital
formation was associated with almost $63 in net capital formation
during the first of the three long swings examined in this monograph,
with less than $55 in net during the second cycle, and with only $34
in the last one. In three periods during the six decades there was actual
net disinvestment in residential real estate: in each of the two World
Wars and during the Great Depression.
The growth of total residential capital, that is, of structure values
in constant prices, has been proceeding at a declining rate. The average
rate of growth per decade was 47 per cent from 1890 to 1909, and
only 31 per cent between 1910 and 1929. During the two decades from
1930 to 1949 the value of residential capital in real terms did little
better than maintain itself, but it increased 14 per cent from 1949 to
1953. The physical stock of housing (number of dwelling units stand-
ing) has continued to grow over the past six decades, but the ratio of
new dwelling units started to the inventory of existing units has shown
a marked downward trend.
Forces Impinging on the Growth of Reidential Capital
On the whole, then, the long-term record of capital formation in
residential real estate points toward arrested growth or actual decline
in real terms, depending upon whether gross or net additions to capital
are considered. The forces underlying this apparent trend are separated
into two parts: factors that have determined the number of dwelling
units built (Chapters V and VI) and factors that have operated to
produce changes in real input per new dwelling unit (Chapter VII).
These forces could conceivably operate in opposite directions. For
example, a decline in the rate of population growth in the long run
might reduce the number of new dwelling units constructed, but if real
input per new dwelling unit rose at the same time, total construction
expenditures in constant prices might still increase or at least fail to
drop.
The first of these two basic groups of forces is more familiar than the
second. Previous investigations have akeady established the long-term
relationship between the growth of nonfarm population and the level
of net additions to the housing stock. The demand unit for housekeep-
ing residential facilities is, of course, the household. The rate of increase
in the number of nonf arm households, as well as in total nonf arm
population, has shown a secular decline during the six decades con-PEEVIEW OFFINDINGS 11
sidered in this study. But the decline in the rate of growth of house-
holds has been only half the reduction in the rate of growth of popula-
tion. Average rates of growth per decade of nonfarm households were
about 34 per cent in 1890-1910, a little over 28 per cent in 1910-1930,
and 26 per cent in 1930-1950. Moreover, absolute increments to house-
holds have been increasing. The lack of increase in the number of new
dwelling units built from the 1905-1925 cycle to the 1925-1950 cycle
therefore cannot be attributed to a declining rate of household growth.
At first sight this finding seems to negate the long-run relationship
between population growth and increments to the housing stock. But
this is not the case, for new construction is but one means of adding to
the housing stock. Conversions of existing dwelling units is another.
During the thirties and forties, conversions probably were at a much
higher level, both in absolute numbers and in relation to new construc-
tion, than in any previous period. The relationship between population
growth and net additions to the housing stock was well maintained
during the last of the three long swings, but there was a marked shift
in the sources of net additions to the housing supply—a shift of greater
significance than has been realized.
The smaller decline in the rate of household growth than in the rate
of population growth has been due to a 20 per cent fall in the average
size of the nonfarm household from 1900 to 1950. This fall can be
attributed in part to the well-known secular drop in birth rates, the
resulting decline in the number of children per family, and the decreas-
ing age at marriage. Another not unimportant factor has been the
establishment of households by social units other than biological
families. In 1950 almost one-quarter of all occupied nonfarm dwelling
units were absorbed by households which were not husband-wife
families.
The manner in which the population arranges itself into households
occupying separate dwelling units has been subject to marked changes,
which are associated with trends in longevity and other demographic
factors, changes in taste and preferences, and the rise in per capita real
income. Under the influence of these factors the social units occupying
or seeking separate dwelling units have become more and more frag-
mentized. To take a synthetic and somewhat exaggerated example, the
household of an immigrant "family" in an urban area fifty years ago
might have consisted of parents, children, one pair of grandparents,
and the father's bachelor brother. In the second or third generation the
same family constellation often resulted in three households, with the
grandparents (whose life spans were lengthened) and the bachelor
brother occupying separate dwelling units. This process of fragmenta-12 PREVIEW OF FINDINGS
tion has tended to maintain the long-term demand for housing at higher
levels than would have been the case otherwise.'
Internal migration other than from farm to city has had significant
effects on the locational distribution of housing construction (Chapter
VI). During the period since 1920, for which data are available, the
regional shifts in residential construction roughly corresponded to
shifts in population. However, there seems to be no evidence that
internal nonf arm migration to date has raised the total level of new
residential construction by significant margins. Large foreign immigra-
tion until the twenties affected the level and timing of building activity
although few immigrants immediately came to occupy new dwelling
units.
It is fair to conclude that the declining rate of population growth
to date has not been the sole cause of the arrested growth of the
number of new dwelling units built. The impact of this force was
blunted by the reduction in average household size and an increase in
absolute increments in households. Rather, the failure of new dwelling
units to rise significantly from the 1905-1925 cycle average to the 1925-
1950 average was associated with a substantial increase in conversions
of existing dwellings.
This conclusion adds to the significance of the second basic group of
forces that has affected the level of residential capital formation: the
factors causing the decline in real input per new dwelling unit (Chap-
ter VII). This decline was as much as 40 per cent from the nineties to
the late forties, and it has been persistent, with the exception of a few
minor fluctuations and one major upturn during the twenties. Here is
a long-term force of major magnitude—a force that seems to have
escaped the attention of previous investigators of this sector of the
economy. A new finding of this kind ought to be closely scrutinized.
Both the statistical reliability of the data and the explanations of the
phenomenon require examination.
The accuracy of the statistical results in this case hinges upon the
reliability of the index of construction cost which is used to transform
expenditures per new dwelling unit in current prices into expenditures
in constant prices, that is, into a measure of real input per unit. There-
fore, the cost index employed for this study was subjected to detailed
scrutiny in the light of related statistical materials. This examination
(Appendix C) leads to the conclusion that, for long-term analysis, the
1Evenmore important than fragmentation, i.e. an increased tendency for adults
to establish separate households, has been the gradual "aging" of the population.
Since 1900 there has been a marked rise in that proportion of the population with
a high propensity toward separate living arrangements. Cf. Louis Winnick, The
Distribution of Housing Space, Wiley, 1956.PREVIEW OFFINDINGS l3
margin of error cannot be very great, so that the index of construction
cost may be used as an approximation of a true price index for new resi-
dential construction.
The finding of a marked downward trend in real capital per new
dwelling unit since 1890 calls for identification of the complex forces
that have determined this change. Some of these have tended to raise
real input per unit; others have operated to reduce it. A mere listing
must suffice at this point, full discussion of these forces and their
interdependence being reserved for Chapters VII and VIII.
The principal factors operating to reduce real capital per new dwell-
ing unit have been:
1. The increasing proportion of housing built in the West and South
where, largely for climatic reasons, input per dwelling unit is
lower than in the East and North
2. The larger proportion of construction in rural nonfarm areas,
where input per unit is lower, since the late twenties
3. A decline in the average size of households and dwelling units
4. The tendency toward lighter materials and construction
5. The long-term increase in the price of new construction relative
to other prices, which has induced consumers to economize on
housing
6. And possibly occupancy of new construction by an increasing per-
centage of families farther down in the income pyramid, at least
during the past fifteen to twenty years
The main forces operating to raise real capital per dwelling unit
have been:
1. The addition or elaboration of construction and equipment items
such as garages, closets, heating systems, and kitchen cabinets
2.Thegrowing proportion of single-family houses since the late
twenties
3. The rise in real income
A rough calculation indicates that three changes in the composition
of new housekeeping residential construction—shifts in its regional
distribution, the larger percentage of construction in rural nonfarm
areas, and the larger proportion of single-family houses—have, taken
in combination, accounted for about one-third to one-half of the
decline in real expenditures per new dwelling unit since the decade of
the twenties. The remaining half to two-thirds of the decline must be
due to the other factors listed above.
That the interplay of all these forces should have produced a marked
decline in real input per new dwelling unit appears at least plausible.
Nevertheless, there remains a puzzling question. The spectacular rise
in per capita real income since 1890 has been accompanied by sub-14 PREVIEWOFFINDINGS
stantial increases in per capita real consumption of nearly all other
broad classes of consumer goods. The drop in real capital per new
dwelling unit, it is true, has been accompanied by a decline in the
average size of the household so that per capita real investment has
fallen much less than 40 per cent or may have been stable. But why
have consumers failed to demand housing of such high quality that
real input per new unit would rise?
A tentative answer to this question is given in Chapter VIII. There
is at least a strong presumption that housing has suffered a decline in
the consumer's scale of preferences, resulting from the emergence of
newer goods and services which have more successfully competed for
a place in family budgets. The automobile, the growing emphasis on
vacations and recreation, the popularity of "eating out," movies, radio
and television, and washing machines and freezers have profoundly
affected the ways consumers spend their income. In this respect,
housing—both an old good and a necessity—has shared the fate of
other old and indispensable commodities.
The failure of consumers to respond to rising per capita real income
by increasing their per capita use of housing resources is evident in
Chart 1. The per capita value in constant dollars of residential capital
(the housing stock) was remarkably stable over the sixty years from
1890 to 1950 and was about the same at the end of the period as at the
beginning.
It would be wrong to conclude from these data that consumers have
derived no increase in satisfaction from new housing or the total stock
of housing. Some reductions in real input per unit, such as is due to
use of lighter structural frames, need not result in lower quality.
Improved design with more efficient space arrangements may have
compensated for the decline in average dwelling unit size. More im-
portant, the sharp dividing lines in statistics between construction
expenditures and expenditures for durable household goods (such as
refrigerators and washing machines) not captured in construction data
become less meaningful when consumer satisfactions from household
operation, or from the dwelling unit and its total equipment, are
considered. In fact, consumers may have substituted outlays for con-
sumer durables, which form part of the household's equipment, for
expenditures covered in residential construction statistics.
A Shrinking Sector of the Economy
In view of these findings it is not surprising that a progressively
smaller part of the nation's aggregate resources have gone into resi-
dential building (Chapter IX). The use of real resources for private
residential construction has shown a marked decline since 1891 inDollars
Source: Table 36.
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CHART 1
Per Capita Value of Residential Capital, 1929 Prices,
Selected Years, 1890-1950
relation to gross national product, total capital formation, and aggre-
gate consumption. Two of these relationships are portrayed in Chart 2.
The ratio of gross capital formation in residential real estate to gross
national product, in real terms, and measured from five-year moving
averages, fell from 8.2 per cent at the beginning of the period to 2.9
per cent in 1950, and the ratio to total consumption in the same terms
fell from over 10 to about 3 per cent. Moreover, the decline during
these sixty years has been persistent, except for the decade of the
twenties.
Residential construction has also become a much less important part
of total gross capital formation. If reckoned in constant prices, for
every $100 invested in new capital assets, about $30 went into resi-
dential real estate in the early nineties, but only $25 in the twenties,
and about $13 in 1950. Residential construction has suffered some
decline even in relation to total new construction.
These great changes must be interpreted in light of the relation-
ship between population growth and net additions to the housing stock.
In no other large sector of the economy has demand been so closely
1990 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 19O16 PREVIEW OF FINDINGS
CHART 2
Ratio of Residential Capital Formation to Gross Notional Product
and Consumption, Selected Years
(based on five-year moving averages of all series in 1929 prices)
Source: Table <—l.
tied to population growth as in residential real estate. Because of the
extreme durability of housing, the level of demand for additional resi-
dential facilities in the long run has been determined by household
growth rather than by replacement of obsolete or used-up units, which
has been important to the demand for commodities with shorter con-
sumption periods. In addition, the declining importance of residential
construction in the nation's total economic effort must be attributed at
least in part to an apparent basic change in consumer attitudes toward
housing.
The massive government aids to private residential construction
which have been in operation since 1935 so far have not reversed the
historical trends of capital formation in this field. Recent as they are,
federal credit aids have come to occupy a strategic position in resi-
dential construction (Chapter X). From 1935 through 1953 more than
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4.5 million new dwelling units, or about 40 per cent of all dweffing
units built, were financed under these government programs. During
the postwar years 1946-1953 alone, 3.3 million units, or almost 42 per
cent of the total, were so financed. It is impossible, of course, to deter-
mine how many of these housing units would have been built in the
absence of federal aids, but the programs tended to reduce down-
payments and carrying charges for new houses and thereby to widen
the market for new construction. Government assistance was probably
more effective in this respect during the recovery period before World
War II than after the war, when liberal credit fortified the price in-
creases due to strong demand for dwellings and thus canceled in part
the advantages of lower credit terms to home purchasers.
While mortgage insurance by the Federal Housing Administration
was designed to stimulate the construction of rental housing as well
as of single-family houses for owner occupancy, it was only after
World War II that its rental housing program became large. In fact,
four-fifths of all rental dwelling units built from 1947 to 1951 were
financed with FHA-insured loans. Nevertheless, the proportion of
rental housing to total residential construction was small compared
with previous periods. The low ratio of building for rent, combined
with the fact that the bulk of rental housing had to be financed under
FHA terms unusually attractive to builders, is perhaps a measure of
the difficulties faced in rental housing investment during the postwar
period.
The emergence of government credit aids has had far-reaching
effects on the institutional arrangements through which capital funds
are channeled into residential construction. This aspect is discussed in
the second major part of the monograph, which deals with long-term
changes in the supply of capital funds for residential real estate.
Trends in the Financing of Capital Growth
The analysis of the flow, uses, and sources of capital funds involves
questions such as these: What have been the proportions of external
and internal funds or, more appropriately in this case, of equity and
debt financing? How important are the various financial intermediaries
in the supply of mortgage loan funds? What has been the role of new
residential construction in the growth of the residential mortgage debt?
What are the relationships between the gross flow of mortgage funds
and the net change in debt? Are the secular trends in capital formation
reflected in the funds accounts? What changes have occurred in the
cost and terms of mortgage financing and how are they related to the
level of capital formation? And what modifications in the flow, sources,18 PREVIEW OF FINDINGS
and costs of capital funds have resulted from the operation of govern-
ment credit aids since the mid-thirties?
The analysis of capital funds again begins with the presentation of
basic data for the period 1890 to 1952. Chapter XI portrays the growth
of the residential mortgage debt. The increase in the physical stock
of housing has been accompanied by a tendency toward greater use
of borrowed funds for the acquisition of new dwellings as well as for
the purchase and reconditioning of old. This tendency toward borrow-
ing has probably been more pronounced in this sector of the economy
than in any other, except for consumers' durable goods. The residential
mortgage debt has increased enormously not only in absolute amount,
as one would expect, but also per capita and per household, and in
relation to total private long-term debt, personal income, and the value
of residential real estate. In the last two of these comparisons, however,
cyclical changes have been as pronounced as long-term trends.
From 1890 to 1952 the residential mortgage debt increased about
30 times, from $2.3 to 69.1 billion. The per capita debt in 1950 was
almost $432 as against $68 in 1890, and indebtedness per nonfarm
household in 1950 was about $1,500 compared with $289 in 1890. The
rise in per capita and per household debt, however, cannot be inter-
preted as evidence of an increasing "burden of indebtedness." The
ratio of debt to disposable income—admittedly a crude measure of
that burden—has shown large variations: a decline from 1900 to 1920;
a spectacular rise during the twenties, resulting in the highest ratio
on record for 1930 (41 per cent); a drop during the next 15 years which
brought the ratio in 1945 down almost to the level of 1910; and a sharp
rise to about 30 per cent in 1952. At that point the ratio was still far
below the 1930 level. Residential mortgage debt in relation to resi-
dential wealth in 1952 (26 per cent) was also below the previous peak
of more than a third, which was reached in the early thirties, although
it rose rapidly after 1945.
It is instructive to relate net increases in residential mortgage debt
to residential construction expenditures. The ratio has increased in
every decade since 1890 except the thirties, and the gain in debt from
1946 to 1950 almost equaled the total outlay for new housekeeping
residential construction. The upward drift of this ratio suggests a
greater use of external funds for the acquisition of new, residential real
estate, but it does not give direct evidence of such a trend. Changes in
the residential mortgage debt are determined by changes in prices and
in financing practices for existing housing and by repayments and other
debt reductions (such as those caused by foreclosure), as well as by
the demand for mortgage funds for new construction. For many
purposes insight into the gross flow of capital funds into residential realPBEVIEW OFFINDINGS 19
estate is as important as are data on net changes in debt. Chapter XII
presents at least partial information of this kind and includes new
estimates of the flow of equity and mortgage funds into new residential
construction, which show more directly changes in the proportion of
these two types of funds in the financing of capital growth.
As to the relationship between gross flow of mortgage funds and net
change in debt, it is found for the late twenties and late forties—two
periods of high lending activity—that roughly $2 to $4 of home loans
were required for every dollar of net increase in the home mortgage
debt (debt on one- to four-family houses). The data suggest also that
in these periods repayments of home mortgage loans equaled more
than half the amount of loans made—a ratio that highlights the im-
portance of repayments as potential sources of funds for reinvestment
in mortgages.
The estimates of the flow of equity and mortgage funds into new
residential construction are admittedly rough in view of the paucity of
basic statistical information. But by themselves and in conjunction with
the mortgage debt data they lead to several important conclusions.
First, from 1911 to 1952 the ratio of equity funds invested in new
residential real estate to expenditures for land and construction appears
to have been higher than is usually assumed when reference is made to
notorious "shoestring" financing in this field. As much as one-quarter to
one-half of the funds used for the acquisition of new residential con-
struction have been in the form of equity funds (including, however,
miscellaneous nonmortgage borrowings). The reader must refer to the
full discussion in Chapter XII for a reconciliation of this finding with
common impressions to the contrary.
Second, this ratio has shown a long-term decline from about one-half
before World War I to approximately one-quarter in recent years, with
conspicuous rises in the proportion of debt financing during the two
construction booms of the twenties and the late forties and early fifties.
Thus the decline in the rate of real capital formation in this sector of
the economy has been associated with a secular drop in the relative
use of equity capital and a corresponding increase in the relative use
of debt financing.
Finally, some evidence is found that the demand for funds originating
in new construction has declined in importance relative to the demand
for funds that originate in transactions involving existing residential
real estate-a finding paralleling that of the declining ratio of new
construction to the stock of residential real estate.
Changes in the sources of mortgage funds are analyzed in Chapter
XIII. Here the most conspicuous trend is the increasing share of finan-
cial institutions in holdings of the residential mortgage debt—from 5020 PREVIEW OF FINDINGS
per cent of the total around the turn of the century to 84 per cent in
1952. Since the twenties the proportion of debt held by life insurance
companies and commercial banks has risen substantially. Life insurance
companies held 6 per cent of the debt in 1920, 10 per cent in 1930, and
over 22 per cent in 1952. Commercial bank portfolios accounted for
about 9 per cent of the debt in 1920 and just over 10 per cent in 1930,
but their share in 1950 was almost as large as that of life insurance
companies. Because of their growth in total assets, both types of institu-
tions managed to increase their share in total residential mortgage
holdings without raising the proportion of assets invested in such
holdings. Savings and loan associations have been the largest holders
of residential mortgage loan portfolios since 1920, accounting for
between a fifth and a quarter of the total during the twenties and in
recent years.
During the first two decades of the century, mutual savings banks
were the largest institutional lender in the residential mortgage field.
However, their share in total debt has declined sharply since the
pre-Worid War I period, from about 25 per cent to 13 to 14 per cent
in recent years. Moreover, mutual savings banks, which from the
beginning of this century to about 1930 had raised the proportion of
assets invested in residential mortgages, reversed this investment pat-
tern thereafter, and it was not until 1952 that they devoted about the
same percentage of their total resources to residential loans as in the
late twenties.
The decline in the relative importance of mutual savings banks as
holders of residential mortgages is due in part to their regional con-
centration in the Middle Atlantic and New England states. The share
of these states in the residential mortgage debt has fallen drastically.
Changes in the regional distribution of the debt have roughly paralleled
those in the regional distribution of new residential construction: there
has been a growing shift from the North and East to the South and
West (Chapter XIV). The shift is illustrated most dramatically in the
holdings of life insurance companies, the only type of institution that
has continuously engaged in nationwide mortgage lending in this
country. On the whole, there has been a tendency toward regional
equalization of institutional mortgage lending activity, but marked
differences persist in the regional distribution of holdings as between
the principal types of lenders.
The growth of the residential mortgage debt and the tendency
toward greater use of debt financing have been associated with sub-
stantial changes in the ease of borrowing—changes which are suscepti-
ble to only partial measurement (Chapter XV). It appears that mort-
gage interest rates since about 1880 have traced out long swings, withPREVIEW OF FINDINGS 21
a decline during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, a rise
to the mid-twenties, and the well-known drop during the thirties and
forties. According to more specific data for institutional loans on one-
to four-family houses, average contract interest rates from 1920 to 1947
declined by about one-quarter while average contract lengths nearly
doubled and loan-to-value ratios for first mortgages increased approxi-
mately one-third.
On the face of it, this is clearly a drastic change in favor of bor-
rowing. That it failed to modify the downward trend in real capital
growth testifies perhaps to the strength of this trend. Moreover, the
effects of the new financing terms on demand for new construction may
have been dulled by the halting and incomplete economic recovery
up to World War II and the severe building restrictions during the
war itself. Finally, the changes in financing terms contain at least one
element that offsets partially the effects of lower interest rates and
longer contract maturities on periodic charges and the demand for
funds: the more common use of amortized loans. Loan amortization,
though a sound financial device, increases the borrower's regular cash
outlay when added to the interest required for unamortized mortgages.
To observe relationships between the ease of borrowing and the
level of housing construction, Chapter XV compares also the long-term
movement of bond yields and selected local mortgage interest rates
with the long-term movement of residential construction expenditures.
The results, beset as they are by conceptual and statistical difficulties,
are no more than suggestive. In two of three long swings a rising level
of construction expenditures was associated with increasing stringency
of capital measured by bond yields and by contract mortgage interest
rates, the exception being the expansion of residential construction
from 1933 to 1950. Also, in all of the three long swings a wide or
widening spread between gross bond yields and contract mortgage
interest rates was associated with major increases in residential build-
ing activity. It is perhaps not amiss to state this negative conclusion:
Historiáally, a decline in interest rates has not been a necessary condi-
tion for an expansion of capital formation in this sector of the economy.
The secular changes in the flow, uses, sources, and costs of capita!
funds for residential real estate, which were sketched to this point,
have been profoundly affected by government credit aids since the
middle thirties (Chapter XVI). Some of the changes, in fact, have
been brought about or hastened by the insurance of mortgage loans
through the Federal Housing Administration and the guarantee of such
loans by the Veterans' Administration. These devices have accentuated
the growth of institutional lending and stimulated particularly the
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improving the marketability of residential loans, they have contributed
to the development of a nationwide mortgage market of a magnitude
probably unprecedented in the history of private mortgage lending in
this country, and have thus helped to produce a more even flow of
funds into various regions. The federal credit aids accelerated the
decline in residential mortgage interest rates and the liberalization of
other contract terms from the middle thirties to recent years.
For the first time in the history of mortgage finance in this country,
the market decisions which before had controlled the allocation of
capital funds to residential construction have been subjected to the
influence of a new force of major dimensions, quite different in impact
and nature of operations from the traditional public supervision of
financial institutions. Investment preferences have been modified by
the insurance or guarantee of residential mortgage loans. Mortgage
interest rates and other contract terms have become subject to govern-
mental as well as private decisions. The Federal National Mortgage
Association, created as a secondary market facility for established
mortgage lenders, has at times become a primary source of funds sup-
plementing those supplied by private financial institutions.
A few figures must suffice at this point to illustrate the dimensions of
this new force. From 1935 through 1952, government-insured or -guar-
anteed mortgage loans on new residential construction amounted to
about $26 billion, or about 45 per cent of the total estimated flow of
mortgage funds into this type of construction. During the postwar
years 1947 through 1952 alone, the amount was $20 billion, represent-
ing about half the total. At the end of 1952 the estimated balance of
FHA and VA loans on both new and existing residential construction
was over $29 billion, or more than two-fifths of the aggregate resi-
dential mortgage debt. During the six years from 1948 through 1953
the Federal National Mortgage Association purchased almost $3.7 bil-
lion of FHA and VA loans. This government agency held about $2.5
billion of such loans in its portfolio at the end of the period, and the
bulk of these were VA loans at 4 per cent interest, which had lost
attractiveness in comparison with other investment outlets of private
financial institutions.
The development of government credit aids on such a scale within
less than twenty years, directly affecting at times up to half the total
market, obviously has far-reaching implications for the future course
of financing and real capital formation in this sector of the economy.
The Place of Residential Building in Economic Growth
The study has revealed the basic trends which determined the role
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from 1890 to the early fifties. Whether the trends of the past will change
in the future depends at least in part upon the strength of their inter-
relationships.
These interrelationships can perhaps be most easily understood if
capital formation in residential real estate is viewed as an integral part
of the economic growth of the United States during the past sixty years.
Urbanization has been a part of this process of growth—a phenomenon
now being duplicated in many of the less-developed countries. It has
been both a condition and a result of the spectacular increase in output
and per capita real income since 1890.
Residential building associated with urbanization required a larger
proportion of the nation's total resources and investment during the
early years of the six decades than during the later years. Certain trends
closely correlated with urbanization reduced the share of residential
construction in the total economic effort: a decline in the rate of growth
of population and households, a fall in the average size of households,
the development of demands for new consumers' goods which soon
competed strongly with housing for a place in the family budget, the
apparent decline in consumer preferences for housing, and the drop
in real input per new dwelling unit associated with several of these
trends.
Urbanization has been basic to the development of highly organized
credit facilities and of consumer attitudes toward borrowing which
encouraged debt financing and the extension of home ownership down
the income scale. Finally, a government long interested in improving
the farmer's fortunes has extended its benevolence to the city and
suburban dweller, and has done so on a truly massive scale.
In the absence of companion studies for other economically advanced
nations it is impossible to tell whether these trends are inherent in
economic growth, but there is sufficient evidence to indicate that many
similar developments have occurred in the countries of Western
Europe. In any event, the persistence and interconnection of the trends
suggest a large degree of future continuity for the United States, assum-
ing that radical relocation of population and industry in the age of
A- and H-bombs can be avoided.
The record of more than six decades of capital formation and financ-
ing in residential real estate raises crucial questions about future capital
growth in this field. Do the findings foreshadow a continued slackening
in the rate of residential capital growth and a progressive decline of the
share of residential construction in total economic activity? If so, will
such a trend affect the role of residential real estate as an outlet for
the investment of capital funds? Will the apparent displacement of
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tion or reversal? Or will government aids, which have become a power-
ful influence in residential construction and its financing, operate to
arrest the historical trends?
Obviously, responses to these questions draw on judgments—though
judgments improved, it is hoped, by whatever contributions the analysis
underlying this volume may have made toward a better understanding
of the complex forces operating on capital formation in residential
construction. Capsule summaries always incur the risk of oversimplifica-
tion and misinterpretation. Nevertheless, an array of broad conclusions
will be presented at this point, with the understanding that the reader
must turn to Chapters XVII to XIX for the reasoning behind them
and for various assumptions on which they are based. The time period
considered extends roughly to 1975.
Factors in Future Capital Growth
The first question to be considered is the future trend in household
growth. No matter which one of widely varying population projections
is accepted, the historical decline in the rate of increase in the number
of nonfarm households is likely to continue—in spite of a further fall
in the average size of household. But absolute increments to the num-
ber of, households, which are directly relevant to the future level of
additions to the housing stock, will probably continue to rise within
the 1950-1975 period.
However, the findings in this volume demand a sharp distinction
between net additions to the housing stock and the number of new
dwelling units built. Conversions of existing units during the thirties
and forties were at a much higher level and represented much more
frequent substitutions for new units than in any previous period on
record. Future conversion potentials are therefore of great significance
for an appraisal of long-term prospects for new residential construc-
tion. The large volume of conversions during the past two decades was
in part caused by special circumstances on both the demand and the
supply side, which were associated first with the depression and then
with World War II. Barring a succession of similar conditions, con-
versions are unlikely to attain again so important a position in the total
supply of additional dwelling units.
Thus the failure of the number of new dwelling units to increase
significantly from the 1905-1925 cycle average to the 1925-1950 average
does not necessarily presage a long-term decline. Moreover, at least two
factors will tend to raise the volume 'of net additions to the housing
stock over and above the level of increments to households. One of
these is internal nonfarm migration. Assuming continued high mobility
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net additions to the housing stock more than it did in the past. For as
the rate of population growth continues to decline, outmigration in an
increasing number of nonfarm areas is likely to lead to actual popula-
tion losses and persistent pockets of vacancies. The migrating house-
holds will create demand for new dwelling units over and above that
associated with the formation of new households.
Second, as per capita real income rises and preference for leisure and
recreation grows, an increasing number of households may be expected
to demand more than one dwelling unit for their use—the additional
units being in the form of summer houses, vacation cottages, and other
"seasonal" accommodations. The beginning of this trend is already
apparent, and, as the trend gathers momentum, the traditional notion
of one dwelling unit per household can no longer be consideied a
general standard.
One might assume that the increasing age of the housing stock would
also tend to raise the level of residential construction, because of
progressively higher rates of demolition of worn-out buildings. How-
ever, the rate of residential demolitions to date has depended more on
the expansion of other land uses in central city areas than on the age
or condition of housing structures, and no appreciable change resulting
from market forces is anticipated in this respect during the next twenty
years or so. The future rate of demolitions may nevertheless be raised
substantially by intensified urban renewal programs, highway con-
struction in built-up areas, and similar activities financed or aided by
governments.
The historical forces tending to reduce real capital per new dwelling
unit have been strong and persistent, and it is difficult to foresee a
reversal in this trend barring a radical change in consumers' attitudes
that would give housing a higher priority on their income. There will
be further improvements and installations in dwelling units that will
tend to raise input per unit, such as air conditioning. But many of the
new equipment items will be accounted for in national output cate-
gories other than new construction expenditures. The factors that have
operated to reduce real input per unit will probably continue, although
some of them may operate with less intensity: a growing proportion
of housing built in the West and South, a decline in the average size
of households and of dwelling units (although there are clearly limits
in the case of the latter), the tendency toward the use of lighter
materials and toward lighter construction, the relative price rise for
new construction, and building for the mass market rather than the
luxury trade.
A radical change in the consumer's scale of preferences in favor of
new housing or better housing is, of course, a possibility. Conceivably,26 PREVIEWOFFINDINGS
when consumers approach an optimum of satisfactions in one or more
components of a high consumption level their attention (and purse)
may shift toward another, and no one will deny that the level of
housing consumption of many American households has increased less
than their level of consumption of food, clothing, amusement, or con-
sumers' durables.
As home ownership and leisure increase, the old adage that a man's
house is his castle may come closer to realization. There is indeed
some evidence that these factors have served to intensify consumers'
interest in good housing during the past few years. It is too early to
tell, however, whether this change signifies more than a reaction to a
long period of prosperity. If historical experience is any guide, a rise
in per capita real income would not be enough to reverse past shifts
in consumer preferences. Moreover, it would be most unreasonable
to assume that the development of new consumer goods and services,
creating further competition for the housing dollar, will come to a halt.
A change in consumers' preferences in favor of housing may be
induced or encouraged by product innovation. If builders could per-
suade consumers to trade old housing units more rapidly and con-
tinually for new units superior in design, style, quality, or prestige
value, the level of demand for residential construction would be raised
substantially. But isthis kind of replacement demand likelyto
materialize within the life span of the next generation? Substantial
innovations in style, design, and quality have appeared in the past
without generating such a revolutionary change in consumers' re-
sponses. Whether it will be produced by the conveniences of a one-
story, single-family house or of air-conditioned buildings or similar
innovations now in sight is open to question.
Even if a change in consumers' preferences is discounted, the rate
of growth of residential capital formation will probably not continue to
decline during the 1950-1975 period. In fact, if the forces operating on
the number of new dwelling units attain the potential strength indicated
earlier, and if the fall in real input per new dwelling unit slows down,
housekeeping residential construction expenditures in real terms prob-
ably will increase over the level of 1925-1950. Moreover, real expendi-
tures for additions and alterations are likely to grow in importance.
Even under optimistic assumptions, however, capital formation in resi-
dential real estate will probably suffer a further relative decline in
the nation's total productive effort.
Such a relative decline would not necessarily or correspondingly
affect the relative opportunities for investment of mortgage funds in
residential real estate. In the first place, the demand for capital funds
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tures for construction in current prices—expenditures which have in-
creased in the long run. Second, the historical tendency toward greater
debt financing of the acquisition of new as well as existing residential
real estate will probably continue. Over half of the owner-occupied
houses in 1950 were held free of debt, and the percentage of such
houses mortgaged may increase. The median ratio of debt to value for
mortgaged properties, 42 per cent for owner-occupied dwellings in
1950, can still rise. If the trend toward greater debt financing con-
tinues, the residential mortgage debt will grow faster than real capital
formation in residential real estate and may increase in relation to total
private long-term debt, as it did in the past. While the financial sound-
ness of such a development may be questioned, the chances that it will
occur are large.
Moreover, a higher probable level of expenditures for modernization
and improvement of existing structures will be associated with greater
demand for debt funds. Investment in nonhousekeeping residential
facilities—motels, tourist courts, vacation cottages, and so forth—will
require additional lending. Not only is demand for such accommoda-
tions increasing but there is a marked tendency toward quality im-
provements requiring larger real inputs and larger amounts of capital
funds. Greater use of "packaged" home mortgages, which include con-
sumers' durables as well as the real estate proper, will raise the demand
for home mortgage funds (at the expense of other types of consumer
credit). The historical evidence points toward increasing demands on
funds for transactions pertaining to existing units, relative to the
demand on funds made by new construction, and this tendency is likely
to continue, particularly if secular price changes are upward. Finally,
the position of financial institutions in this field can still be enhanced
by increases in their share in the total residential mortgage debt at the
expense of that of noninstitutional lenders.
All these observations have ignored what is potentially perhaps the
most important variable: the future role of government. The concern
of government with housing and its financing, though it originated in
depression emergencies and was intensffied by war and postwar disloca-
tions, is likely to be a lasting and probably increasing influence on
residential construction. This concern, by no means limited to housing
of the poor, expresses deep-seated social forces which invest housing
with real and probably growing public interest. Although the scope
and means of government action may differ in varying political and
economic climates, use of federal aids for residential construction is
likely to increase not only because they are tools in a broad program
to improve housing conditions but also because they fit in with full
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dependent upon government aids that they, as well as consumers'
groups, invariably turn to Washington whenever a decline in the
volume of building occurs or threatens.
Thus the level of residential construction during the next few decades
will depend on political decisions as well as on the market, which was
controlling before the thirties. Government will attempt to maintain a
high volume of house building even in the face of declining market
demand. In a broad sense the community at large, through the federal
government as its agent, will attempt to revise the allocation of real
resources to housing—a revision which consumers individually seem to
have been unwilling or unable to undertake. Even without a "grand
design" in allocating national resources, the rapidly growing interest
of the federal government in the support of residential construction
may broadly be interpreted as an effort to counteract the results of the
historical forces that have led to a relative displacement of housing in
the nation's total economic product.
Past experience does not tell us how effective such an effort will be,
particularly under adverse conditions such as contractions in employ-
ment and income. How consumers will react to further liberalization of
credit is uncertain, although it is fairly well established that housing
demand responds more to fluctuations in income than to price changes
(including changes in the cost of borrowing). This much of a conclu-
sion seems warranted, however: Government policies that shift a larger
proportion of total resources to housing will probably greatly change
institutional arrangements for handling the residential mortgage debt—
and the changes may be more drastic than those brought about by
federal insurance or guarantee of mortgage loans. These latter devices
have already so liberalized residential mortgage credit terms that there
seems little more to be done in this direction to make borrowing
easier. Thus demands for "stronger medicine" in the way of federal
credit assistance will undoubtedly develop.
The future level of private residential construction will also be
affected by government aids to urban redevelopment, which have just
begun to operate on a small scale. In the past, demolitions of residential
structures have been so few in relation to the housing stock that their
influence on the volume of new house building has been negligible. But
government programs for urban redevelopment involve demolition of
existing housing and its replacement on a scale far greater than has•
ever been experienced. The assumption of a one-to-one relationship
between the number of demolished and the number of new dwelling
units, which is implied in existing numerical projections of capital
requirements for urban redevelopment, must be seriously questioned.
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housing are new factors to be reckoned with in an appraisal of long-
term prospects of private capital formation and financing in this field.
Finally, a word on the time pattern of residential construction to
1975. Regardless of the "causes" of past long swings in residential con-
struction, the time pattern during the next two decades will be strongly
influenced by previous fluctuations in marriage and birth rates, previous
economic cycles, and past wars and their aftermaths. These factors
indicate that pressure of housing demand on new residential construc-
tion will be relatively low in the early part and relatively high in the
later part of the remaining period to 1975.
Here again, government activities are potentially capable of modify-
ing the fluctuations that may result from the operation of market forces.
The record of the use of federal credit aids as a stabilizing influence in
residential construction is by no means encouraging. Government
programs until 1950 operated primarily on a one-way street toward
more liberal credit, even when restraint has seemed to be called for.
But the need for meshing housing programs with general fiscal and
economic policies has received increased recognition, and it is perhaps
not too much to hope that intelligent application of government aids in
periods of expansion as well as of contraction will contribute to greater
stability in this important sector of the economy.